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Today  I  want  to  discuss  some  of  my  thoughts  on  the nature  of  the
problems  of  economic  policy  and  the  management  of  economic  policy.
Inevitably  the current  state  of the economy  occupies  a substantial  part of
the  time  of  the Council  of Economic  Advisers.
The  basic  question  that  we  find  ourselves  struggling  with  in  the  area
of  general  economic  policy  is  how  successful  we  are  going to  be  in  trying
to  cool an  inflation which by now is running well  into  its fourth  year.  This
gives  rise to one  of the practical  problems in the  management  of economic
policy:  the  problem  of  the substantial  lags  which  exist  between  a  change
in  policy  and  the  visible  effect  of  that  change  on  the  economic  scene-
in  a nation  not  noted for its  patience  in economic  matters.  When  we read
that  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  has  increased  the  discount  rate,  we  are
inclined to check it out in the grocery  store the next morning, and if we find
it  had  no  effect  on  prices,  to  conclude  that  obviously  the  policy  failed.
This  tendency  leads  to  a  certain  amount  of  "popular"  support  for  direct
controls  on  wages  and  prices.  If  the  problem  is  rising prices,  some  sug-
gest  that we  just  decree  that prices  cannot  rise  and  thereby  eliminate  the
problem,  at  least  ostensibly  so.
One  of  the  interesting  current  questions  has  to  do  with  monetary
policy.  We  have a  conjuncture  of development  that has made  at least most
of us,  after  quite  a period  of years,  somewhat  more Friedmanesque  in our
thinking.  The  attention  to monetary  policy  and  the  propensity  to  take  it
seriously  is,  I think,  a wholly  worthwhile  development,  as  is  the  tendency
to  calibrate  the  ease  or tightness  of monetary  policy  not in terms  of rates
but in terms  of rates  of expansion of bank credit and the money supply.
This  is  all  very  heartening  in  my  judgment.  I  think  it  is moving
economic  policy  in  the  direction  of  greater  realism.  However,  now  we
suddenly  find  that  nobody  knows  what  is  happening  to  the  quantity  of
money.  We thought  we knew that there had been  a rapid rate of expansion
in  the  second  half  of  the  year  and  a  very  slow  rate  of  expansion  since
that  time.  But  now  we  find  we  can  interpret  what  has  happened  to  the
money supply pattern  or profile  in any  one  of two or three  ways.  We  can
say  that  monetary  policy:  (1)  continued  to  be  one  of  fairly  active  ease
through  April  with  some  diminution  at  that  point,  or  (2)  was  easy  up
until  about December  with a pretty tight monetary  policy  after  December,
or  (3)  was  some gradation  in between  depending  on  what kind  of  pattern
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message  that  what  is  happening  to  the  quantity  of  money  is  important
apparently  has  gotten  through,  we  suddenly  find  that  nobody  knows  what
is  really happening  to the  quantity  of money.
Before  I turn  to other matters,  I want to say that we have  to recognize
that the  economy  does  face  a difficult  transition  period.  I  wish there  were
some  formula for  economic  policy by  which  we could  foresee  a  slackening
in  the  rate  of increase  in the  price  level  and  a  concomitant  settling  of the
rate  of  wage  increases  so  that  these  two  would be  broadly  consistent,  with
no  adverse  effect  on  output,  productivity,  and  so  forth.  Unfortunately,  the
history  of  transition  from  a  period  of  inflation  to  one  of  greater  price
stability  is  that  all  of  the  wrong  things  tend  to happen  early  in  the  game
and  mostly  to  those  who  are  not  expecting  it.  This  is  a  very  disquieting
situation.  What  we  are  apt to  see  is  a  slowing  of the  rate  of  expansion  in
the  money  volume  of business  activity-gross  national  product  in  current
prices-with  a  tendency  for the  price  indexes  to  roll  along  relatively  un-
touched.  Thus,  at  the  early  stage  of  the  game  we  see  such  things  as  a
diminishing  rate  of  increase  in  real  output;  and,  since  productivity  is
heavily output  oriented,  we  also see  a deterioration  in the rate of improve-
ment  of productivity  with  its  adverse  effect  on costs and  profits.  All of the
things  that  we  did  not want  to have  happen  are happening,  and  the  thing
that  we  most  want  to  have  happen,  an  early  quieting  down  of  the  price
level,  does  not  seem to happen.  This is the kind  of sequence  of events that
we  shall  have  to expect,  and we  ought not  be too  startled if some  of these
things  develop.
I would like now to look rather broadly  at the management of economic
policy.  I  think  we  all  have  to  recognize  that  the  whole  question  of  what
our  national  price  level  objective  ought  to  be  is  itself  in  a  rather  un-
satisfactory  state.  For  example,  although  the  language  of Section  2  of the
Employment  Act of  1946,  which is  our  basic  declaration  of  national  eco-
nomic  policy,  contains  no  explicit  reference  to  price  level  stability,  the
language  in  all but  three  of  the  Economic  Reports  of the  President  makes
it  clear  that  each  administration  considered  price  level  stability  to  be  a
major  objective  of  national  economic  policy.  The  three  exceptions  ap-
peared  in  recessions  or  in  periods  of  fairly  slack  business  activity  when
the  whole  issue  was  simply not  as  important  as other  things.
So we  have  this rather  curious  situation where  the national government
will  indicate  that price level  stability  is  an important  objective  of economic
policy.  And  yet  if  we  look  at  the  history  of  the  price  level  through  that
period,  we  probably  would  find  only  two  or  three  years  in  which  the
consumer  price  index  for  the  year  was  lower  than that  for  the preceding
year.  And  I  suspect  in  most of  those  cases  the  drop  was  due  to a  decline
in food  prices.
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recite  words  without  bothering  much  about  the  content  and without,  for
that  matter,  letting  the  meaning  affect  our lives  very  much.  However,  one
also  has  to  say that at  this  juncture  in our history the  price  level  problem
and  how to deal with  it have  achieved  a degree  of urgency  far more basic
than simply  the  fact that  somebody  looked back and  saw  that over a  long
period of  time  the  price level  tends  to rise.
I think  we  would  all  agree  that  we  now have  a difficult  problem,  and
it arises  from the  fact  that we now  see a  more  hardened  skepticism  about
the  longer  run  value  of money,  in  fixed  dollar  terms,  than  we  did  in the
earlier  postwar  period.  I  think  this  grows  out  of  two  factors.  One  is  the
fact  that  for  about  four  years,  beginning  in  about  1966,  we  have  had
inflation-interrupted  almost indiscernibly  in  1967. Moreover,  the  rates  of
increase  in  the  price  level  themselves  tended  to  accelerate  during  most of
this  period.  The rate  of  increase  in  the  price  level  in  1966  was  about  50
percent  greater  than in  1965.  There  was  a little  interlude  in  1967  because
we had  a slight  recession  in  the  first half  of the year which  dented the up-
ward  rise  in  the  price  level,  but not  much  more  than  that.  But  in  1968
the rate of increase  in the  price level  was  about  50 percent  greater  than in
1967.  The  rate  of  increase  so  far  this  year  has  been  about  50  percent
greater  than  it  was  in  1968.  I  think  this  has  had  a  profound  effect  on
people's  thinking,  which  I do not  recall  in the  earlier postwar  period when
we  also had  price  level problems.
Not too  long  before I came  to Washington,  I  was having  lunch with  a
colleague  of  mine  in  Ann  Arbor,  a  Professor  of English.  He  said,  "You
know,  I  have  a savings  account  at  the  Savings  Bank  and  I'm getting  5/4
percent,  but I'm not  coming  out very  well  on that.  I've got to pay income
taxes  on  that  and  when  I  look  at  what's  left  over  and  compare  it  with
what's  happening  to  the  cost  of  living,  I'm  hardly  holding  even."  What
was  being  manifested  in  his  comment  is  something  that  we  are  seeing  in
a  great  many  forms  in our  economy  now:  the growing  tendency  to think
in  terms  of  real  interest  rates.  You  see,  this  fellow  was  discovering  that
this  nominal  rate  of interest  was  giving  him  a  real  rate  of  interest which
was  less  than  zero.
The shift from  1967  to  1968  in the increase in  the proportion  of funds
funneled  through the capital markets  via investment  companies  and mutual
funds  is one  illustration  of the disinclination to take  on investment  in fixed
denominated  obligations.  A mortgage  is  all right  on an  apartment  building
providing  it  has  an equity  kicker  or providing,  to use  the phrase,  "you  get
a piece of the action."  But just a straight orthodox mortgage  at 71/2 percent
a year does  not now hold much interest.  Why? Well,  I think, we are  seeing
the  pervasive  influence  of the  growing concern  about whether  we  can con-
tinue to  count on the  price  level itself.  I think it  is important  to recognize
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sumption  that  it  is  going  to  continue,  itself  starts  to  have  socially  dis-
organizing  effects.  It  inevitably  will  produce  very  high  interest  rates.  I
need  not  emphasize  that  what  we  are  seeing  is  the  classic  response  of
interest  rates  to  sustained  inflation  and  not  the  deliberate  use  of  high
interest  rates  to control  inflation.
This  is  the  kind  of  thing which  an Irving  Fisher,  or  for that  matter  a
John  Stewart  Mill,  would  have  had  no  difficulty  in  understanding.  You
remember  Irving  Fisher's  comment  that the  market rate  of interest will  be
the  real  rate  of  interest  plus  the  expected  change  in the  price  level.  This
is  exactly  what  we  are  seeing  here.  But I  think  this  situation  is  not  only
caused  by long-run  inflation;  it  is  also helped by the fact that we have had
three  rather  highly visible  policy episodes  in  the  last three  years  where we
seemed  to  be facing up to the  need  for achieving  a  more stable  price level
and  then  we backed  away  from  it.  Let me  say  that I do not  mean  this  in
any  partisan  sense  whatsoever,  because  in  many  cases  or  certainly  in
some  of  these  cases,  my  counterparts  who  were  in  the  Council  of  Eco-
nomic  Advisers  at  that  time  were  on  the  side  of  the  angels,  and  it  will
come  as  no  surprise  if  the  CEA  is  still  occasionally  losing  an  argument
within  the  administration.
One  of these  episodes  was the  failure  to go  for a tax increase  in early
1966  at  a  time  when  expenditures  were  embarking  on  a  course  that  by
fiscal  year  1968  would  carry  them  some  $25  billion  above  the  revenue-
producing  capacity  of the  tax  system  even at extremely high  levels  of  em-
ployment.
Second,  we  had  a  moment  of  truth  in monetary  policy  later  in  1966
-the  period  of the  credit  crunch.  But the pressures  in  the market  fright-
ened  us  so  much that we backed  off,  and  from that time until the devalua-
tion of sterling in November  1967,  monetary policy was  overcompensating
for  that  moment  of  tightness.  All. through  that  period  we  were  having  a
rate  of  monetary  and  credit  expansion  which  was  roughly  double  what
would  have  been consistent  with reasonably  stable  ongoing  growth  for the
economy.
The  third  episode  is  the  unfortunate  easing  of  monetary  policy  after
the  surcharge  was  passed  a  little  over  a  year  ago.  I  think  this  is  a  par-
ticularly  unfortunate  although  interesting  episode  in  economic  policy.
Members  of the  Congress  were put under great  pressure by widely  varying
segments  in our national  life,  including  the monetary  authority,  to face  up
to  the  need  for  a  tax  increase  at  a politically  awkward  time,  namely  in a
Presidential  election  year.  The  ink was  hardly  dry  on  this  bill  before  we
started getting nervous about overkill.  We had a definite easing of monetary
policy in  the second  half of  1968.
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it  creates  an  agonizing  evaluation  for  those  who  have  to  accept  respon-
sibility  for  the  consequences  of  the  policy.  It  is very  tempting  to operate
on  the  thesis,  for  example,  that  real  output,  real  income,  and  total  em-
ployment  are  the  important  things  and  not  the  price  level.  However,  we
have to  recognize  two  things:  First,  this  kind of  price inflation  itself  starts
to  exact  social  damage  of its  own.  Second,  it  inevitably  will tend to  pro-
duce  extremely  high  rates  of  market  interest  as  a  way  to  overcome  de-
clining  rates  of real  interest.
In  time  we  run  afoul  of  interest  rate  ceilings  in  our  institutional  ap-
paratus,  which  further  complicates  matters.  And  it  happens  to  work  out,
given  our  institutional  arrangements,  that  one  of  the  major  casualties  is
housing.  These  are  some  of  the  facts  of  life  that  emerge  as  you  let  this
kind  of  thing  run,  and  it  becomes  easier  to  see  why  economists  think  in
terms  of  alternative  strategies  of  policy,  each  of  which  has  painful  out-
comes.  Perhaps  one  way  to  state  the  objective  of policy  is  that  we  ought
to  minimize  the  present  value  of future  economic  damage,  and  this  dam-
age  is  multidimensional.
What does  all of this lead  to? Trying to get the economy quieted  down,
to get  it moving  along  the path  of reasonable  price stability and reasonably
full  employment  creates  difficult  near-term  problems.
What  are  the  implications  of  this?  I  still  think  we  must  have  a  far
more  even-handed  management  of economic  policy than we have  had,  and
than  has  been  called for  by our theory  or  conception  of  economic  policy.
The concept  of the problem  as  one of a  highly unstable  private  sector that
has  to be  civilized  by vigorous  counterswings  in policy  has  not  served our
interests well  because most of these sharp swings  in the private sector have
had  their origin,  to a  significant  extent,  in  the  erratic  course  of  fiscal  and
monetary policies.  Consequently,  we have to recognize  the need to manage
economic  policies  within  narrower  and  more sophisticated  tolerances  than
in  the past.  We  cannot  expect  to have  the kind  of course for the  economy
that we want  if we  go  from  a  credit crunch in  1966  to a rate  of monetary
and  credit  expansion  a  few  months  later,  that  is  at  least  double  what  we
ought  to have  for  the  ongoing  growth  of  the  economy.
This  year,  I think  there  have  been  some  organizational  changes  that
warrant  being pointed out to those  who are  interested in national  economic
policy.
One  of them  is that we now have three key groups  at the Cabinet level,
apart  from  the  Cabinet  itself,  presided  over  by  the  President,  which  en-
able  us to  see  the multidimensional  implications  of programs  and policies
more  clearly  than  before.  I  refer  to  the  National  Security  Council,  the
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While  there  is  always  one  vote  at  these  meetings  that  can  swamp  the
others,  these  groups  provide  a  forum  for  debate  and  consensus.  For  ex-
ample,  it  was  in  the  Urban  Affairs  Council  that the  new  welfare  program
was  hammered  out.  Consequently,  we  have  national  security  policy,  eco-
nomic  policy,  social  policy,  but  each  with  enough  overlap  so  that  we  do
not look  at  these things  in  mutually  exclusive  terms.
When it  comes to fiscal  policy,  it seems  to me that  a more evenhanded
management  of  economic  policy  means  that  we  cannot  afford  to  embark
on  a  program  leading  to  a  major  disparity  between  expenditures  and the
revenue-generating  capacity  of  the  tax  system  under  reasonably  full  em-
ployment.  This  is  not  to say  that  we  can never  afford to have  a  deficit  in
the  budget.  But we cannot  afford  to  have an  imbalance  of  any substantial
proportions.  Not  only  does  fiscal  policy  have  its  own  peculiar  effects  on
the  economy  through  the  level  of  aggregate  business  activity,  but it  also
affects  the  pattern  or  distribution  of  resources  just  as  both  budgetary
deficits  and  surpluses  carry  their own  implications  about  the allocation  of
scarce  resources.  Indeed,  I think one  of the most interesting exercises  that
we  have  gone  through  in  Washington  was  a  full  presentation  before  the
Cabinet  Committee  on  Economic  Policy  in  regard  to the so-called  "peace
dividend."  What  we  did  was  to  try  to  make  it  clear  that  the  pie  being
considered  for  allocation  is  not  the  budget.  It  is  the  total  gross  national
product.
What  we  are  really  saying  is  that  fiscal  policy  must  be  managed  not
only  to  avoid  the  wrong  aggregate  demand  for  output  but also  to  avoid
creating  conditions  where  we  will  get  the  wrong  allocation  of  resources
relative  to the commitments  we  have made  at  home  and  abroad.
Of  course,  that  is  what  economics  is  all  about,  and  the  available
budgetary  elbow  room  usually  provides  for  only  a  small  fraction  of  the
ideas  for  new  programs that have  some degree  of commitment from  some
important  agencies  in  Washington  or  some  important  groups  in  our  na-
tional  life.  This  inevitably  means that,  in  order to  finance  more,  someone
must persuade  the  Congress  to increase tax  rates.  Having  a certain amount
of  scar  tissue from  the  1969 battle  over taxes,  I would  be inclined  to say,
"More  power to you  if you can sell that." You may be lucky if you can hold
your  ground.  After  all,  what  is  so  bad  about  a deficit?  One  thing that  is
bad  about  a  deficit  is  that  it  is  going  to  create capital  market  conditions
which  will  make  other goals  such  as  housing  almost impossible to achieve.
All  of  this  is  merely  to  say  that  the  key  relief  to  fiscal  policy  is  ex-
penditure  policy.  It  is  here  that  we  have  to  devote  increasing  attention,
and  we  have  been.  I think  we  have  made  considerable  progress  in many
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one  who  is  now  in  Washington,  I  do  not  find  it  difficult  to  restrain  my
enthusiasm  for  an  expenditure  ceiling.  It  is  the  one  way  by  which  the
Congress  faces  up  to  the  discipline  of  the  total  budget  and  this  is,  of
course,  crucially  important.
Monetary policy is more important than we perhaps had realized earlier.
It is powerful,  but it  also influences  the economy  with long  and  distributed
lags.  This  has  implications  for  the  management  of  monetary  policy  be-
cause  we  cannot  see  an  aberration  in  the  economy,  change  policy,  and
hope  to  have  an  immediate  effect.  Instead,  the  effect  may  occur  so  far
ahead  that  the  complex  of  economic  development  is apt  to be  something
different.
We  need  to  give  much  more  attention  to  programs  that  will  improve
the  operation  of  the  market economy.  While  antitrust policy is  important,
more  fundamental  are  the  manpower  training  and  labor  market  areas.
Manpower  policies  and  institutional  machinery  to  make  the  labor  market
work better  are  needed.  We  have  to move  further  in  these  areas,  and we
also  need to  be  more  concerned  with programs  that  cushion  generally  the
differential  impact  of  economic  readjustment  on  individuals.  These  range
all  the  way  from income  maintenance  programs  of  some kind to  strength-
ening  the  unemployment  compensation  system  and  manpower  training
programs.  If some  people  are  out  of the labor market  or  not working for
a  time,  they  can  at least use  that  time productively  in manpower  training
to upgrade  skills.
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